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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.
Is an expressive boycott by court-appointed criminal
defense attorneys designed to influence the passage of
legislation protected by the first amendment from antitrust
prosecution?
2.
Does application of the rule of reason, which requires
the FTC to prove that the Lawyers' conduct had an anticompetitive
effect, adequately protect the government's interest in
preserving competition when balanced against the Lawyers' first
amendment rights?
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No. 88-1198
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FALL TERM 1989
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
Petitioner,
V.
SUPERIOR COURT TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinions of the administrative law judge and the Federal
Trade Commissioner are reported at In re Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass'n. 107 F.T.C. 510 (1986).

The opinion of the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is reported
at Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
856 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia was entered on August 26, 1988.
petition for writ of certiorari was filed.
April 17, 1989.

A timely

It was granted on

The jurisdiction of this Court rests upon 28

U.S.C. section 1254(1).
1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
This case involves the first amendment and sixth amendment
to the United States Constitution and section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. section 1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1964, the District of Columbia enacted the Criminal
Justice Act ("CJA”) to provide for the defense of indigent
defendants in criminal cases.

The CJA provides reimbursement to

private, court-appointed attorneys for their defense of the
indigent accused.

(J.A. 6.)

Any local member of the D.C. bar in

good standing may receive CJA appointments.

Court employees

allocate the defense cases on a first come, first served basis to
the attorneys who have indicated their CJA availability on a
daily basis.

(J.A. 8.)

Approximately 1,200 lawyers are

registered with the CJA office at any one time, but most
appointments go to a group of 100 attorneys who almost
exclusively represent clients under the CJA.

(J.A. 7.)

CJA

attorneys are responsible for roughly 85% of the indigence cases.
(J.A. 7.)
Respondent Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association ("the
Lawyers") is a loosely organized association of CJA attorneys
which became the organizing force of the boycott at issue in this
case.

(J.A. 10.)

CJA compensation rates have been raised only

once since 1964, and in 1983 the Lawyers were being compensated
at rates set 13 years earlier without any cost-of-living
adjustments ($20 per hour for out of court, $30 per hour for in
2

court, subject to specific ceilings per case).

(J.A. 10.)

The

average CJA attorney makes about $20,000 per year and works
without any support services.

(J.A. 12.)

In 1975, years prior to the current boycott, a committee
report found that the existing rates were too low and adversely
impacted the quality of representation.

(J.A. 12.)

The report

also found that the inadequate rates were partially responsible
for the attrition of experienced CJA attorneys and the
unwillingness of new and qualified professionals to enter the
criminal defense practice.

It recommended to raise the fee to a

uniform rate of $40 per hour.

(J.A. 11.)

Several later reports

expressed concern about possible violations of the sixth
amendment based on inadequate trial preparation.

(J.A. 12.)

The pre-boycott reform efforts of the Lawyers failed largely
because neither indigent defendants, nor their criminal defense
attorneys were significant political constituencies.

This had an

adverse impact on the availability of public funds for their
concerns.

(J.A. 16.)

Prior to the boycott in 1983, Lawyers vigorously petitioned
the legislature to change the compensation rates under the Act.
Their lobbying effort included meetings with the D.C. Mayor and
the Chief Judge of the Superior Court.

The Chief Judge refused

to support reform legislation because the Superior Court might
have to rule on the legality of an eventual bill, and the Mayor's
office informed the Lawyers that though the Mayor supported their
position, he could not push for reform without the Chief Judge's
3

endorsement.

(J.A. 13.)

In 1982, the D.C. Council introduced a reform bill, but the
bill died due to an alleged lack of funding.

Nevertheless, in

1983, based upon the consistent lobbying efforts of the Lawyers,
the D.C. Council Chairman introduced another bill.

(J.A. 14)

In

June of 1983, a Councilmember and the city's Budget Director
informed the Lawyers that, once again, no money could be found to
fund the measure.

Although the entire D.C. government supported

the bill, the Lawyers realized that it had a very low chance of
actual passage.

(J.A- 14.)

The Lawyers eventually voted in

favor of a boycott in case the bill failed to pass by September
6, 1983.

Nonetheless, the CJA leadership continued its lobbying

efforts through the late summer.

(J.A. 15.)

On August 29, 1983,

the Lawyers met with the Mayor, who supported the bill and was
fully aware of the impending boycott, yet emphasized that he was
unable to push for passage of the legislation in the absence of
an emergency situation.

(J.A. 15.)

In connection with the boycott efforts, the Lawyers
organized several public awareness events, including rallies and
press interviews.

(J.A. 17.)

When their lobbying efforts

failed, they refused to take on new cases.

Within a few days the

Mayor pressed for passage of emergency legislation basing his
pleas on "the importance of quality representation of indigent
defendants."

(J.A. 19.)

The availability of attorneys willing

to take CJA cases increased immediately after the boycott.
16.)
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(J.A.

During the boycott the FTC filed suit alleging that the
Lawyers had conspired to fix prices and to conduct a boycott in
violation of antitrust laws.

(J.A. 2.)

The District of Columbia

never asked the FTC to intervene, nor did it assert its own
antitrust provisions.

(J.A. 2.)

In the initial decision, the administrative law judge held
that although the boycott did not constitute petitioning for
legislation or a political activity, it failed to have an adverse
effect on competition.

(J.A. 26.)

He further found that at the

post-boycott rates the number of lawyers willing to take CJA
cases increased.

(J.A. 20.)

On appeal, the Federal Trade Commissioner reversed on the
issue of liability and concluded that the boycott was per se
illegal because it represented a facially anticompetitive
agreement.

(J.A. 45.)

The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that although
the boycott fell within the type of activity which usually
violated the Sherman Act, it could not be held illegal per se.
The Court refrained from granting first amendment immunity to the
boycott, but reasoned that to adequately account for the Lawyers'
first amendment rights, the FTC had to prove that the Lawyers
possessed sufficient market power in order to justify the
condemnation of an expressive boycott.
The FTC is now asking for a reversal of the D.C. Circuit's
ruling requiring a finding of market power.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The first amendment protects the Lawyers' conduct from
antitrust prosecution on two grounds.

Firstly, the Lawyers

petitioned the legislature through their boycott.

This Court has

established a doctrine which exempts private efforts to petition
the legislature from antitrust prosecution if they are taken in
an appropriate context and are of the appropriate nature.

Given

the unique context and nature of their conduct, the Lawyers are
exempt from antitrust prosecution.
Secondly, the Lawyers' action advanced the constitutional
right to adequate counsel of their indigent defendants.

Because

the Lawyers' clients are an underrepresented class not in a
position to petition the legislature for change themselves, the
Lawyers' action represents political expression deserving first
amendment protection.
Alternatively, if this Court does not find that the Lawyers'
conduct was immune from antitrust laws, it should hold that the
rule of reason applies to this case.

The per se rule, which

presumes the anticompetitive effect of a restraint, is limited to
cases involving horizontal price constraints that obviously
suppress competition.
The rule of reason analysis requires the FTC to prove that
the boycott constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade within
the meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

Under the rule of

reason, the court must inquire into the industry in which the
restraint was applied, its history and the market conditions
6

before and after the restraint.

In a legislatively controlled

market, which provides a constitutionally mandated service to an
indigent customer, traditional antitrust analysis leads to a
distorted result.

In the long-run, the Lawyers' actions served

to increase the effectiveness of and the competition for legal
representation of indigent defendants in the District of
Columbia.

Their conduct further advanced the sixth amendment

right to counsel of indigent defendants who lack the means to
advocate their own constitutional rights.
Because the Lawyers' conduct involved active lobbying of the
D.C. legislature and an extensive media campaign, their eventual
boycott contained a strong expressive component.

In United

States v. O'Brien. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), this Court held that
conduct with an expressive component should not be restricted in
any non-essential manner.

To apply the per se rule and presume

that this type of conduct most likely restricts competition would
violate the Lawyers' first amendment rights.

In balancing the

government's interest in maintaining competition against the
Lawyers' first amendment rights, the government's interest is
sufficiently protected if the FTC is required to prove the
anticompetitive effect of the Lawyers' conduct.
ARGUMENT
I.

BECAUSE THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTS NON-VIOLENT FORMS OF
POLITICAL EXPRESSION FROM PROHIBITION, THE CJA LAWYERS*
ACTION TO REFORM THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWS IS EXEMPT FROM
ANTITRUST PROSECUTION.
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The framers of the Bill of Rights recognized the importance
of free expression to a representative democracy by enacting the
first amendment which prevents the government from prosecuting
groups for expressive activity.

U.S. Const, amend. I.

The

petitioners, a governmental agency, seek to prosecute the Lawyers
for their concerted action in protest of an unjust criminal
defense system.

The Lawyers* conduct is protected from antitrust

prosecution by the first amendment for two reasons.

Firstly, the

Lawyers* petitioned the legislature through their boycott.

The

Noerr doctrine, established by this Court in Eastern R.R.
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight. 365 U.S. 127 (1961), exempts
such efforts from antitrust prosecution.

Secondly, the Lawyers*

action advanced the interests of their clients as well as their
own because it served to protect the constitutional right of
indigents to adequate counsel.

U.S. Const, amend. VI.

Because

the Lawyers' clients are not in a position to petition the
legislature for change themselves, the Lawyers' action represents
political expression deserving first amendment protection.
A.

The Noerr doctrine exempts the Lawyers' effort to
petition the legislature from antitrust prosecution.

Decisions of this Court establish an exception from
antitrust laws for actions designed to petition the legislature.
The exception gained its name from the Noerr case.
U.S. 127.

Noerr. 365

The defendants in Noerr. an association of railroads

and their public relations firm, launched an allegedly fraudulent
publicity campaign designed to promote laws and enforcement

8

practices harmful to the trucking industry.

The plaintiffs,

representatives of the trucking industry, alleged that the
defendants had illegally used the campaign to monopolize the long
distance freight market.

The trial court found the campaign to

be a malicious and fraudulent attempt to destroy the truckers as
competitors and held that the campaign violated the Sherman Act.
Noerr. 365 U.S. at 132-33.
While acknowledging the anticompetitive purpose and
potential effect of the campaign, this Court exempted the
defendant's conduct from antitrust violations:
To hold that the government retains the power to act
in [a] representative capacity and yet hold, at the
same time, that the people cannot freely inform the
government of their wishes would impute to the Sherman
Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but
political activity, a purpose which would have no basis
whatever in the legislative history of that Act.
Noerr. 365 U.S. at 137.

In refusing to impute to Congress an

intent to invade the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights,
Id. at 138, this Court found that unless a publicity campaign was
a "mere sham" constructed to injure a competitor, the right to
petition should be protected.

Id. at 144.

The Noerr exception applies to petitioners of the
legislature with self-interested motives.

The Noerr court

reasoned that:
[a] construction of the Sherman Act that would disqualify
people from taking a public position on matters in which
they are financially interested would thus deprive the
government of a valuable source of information and, at the
same time, deprive the people of their right to petition in
the very instances in which that right may be of the most
importance to them.
9

Id. at 139.

Subsequent case law confirmed the Noerr rationale in

excepting self-interested petitioners from antitrust liability.
In the case of United Mine Workers v. Pennington. 381 U.S. 657
(1965) , the trial court instructed the jury that if an
anticompetitive purpose was found, they were free to find an
illegal conspiracy.
reversible error.

This Court found the instruction to be
Referring to the Noerr case, the Court stated

that "[njothing could be clearer from the Court's opinion than
that anticompetitive purpose did not illegalize the conduct there
involved."

Pennington. 381 U.S. at 669.

Thus, whether or not

the Lawyers' conduct was motivated by their own economic gain,
the Noerr doctrine should apply to this case.

The key factor is

not their motive as the Pennington case emphasized, but whether
or not their effort was an attempt to petition the legislature
protected by the first amendment.
In the present case, the Lawyers were clearly petitioning
the legislature as required by Noerr.

Their conduct was a direct

attempt to influence the body responsible for funding the defense
of indigent defendants to reform the criminal defense rate
structure.

The group did all that it could to attract the

attention of the public and votes of the legislators both prior
to and during the boycott.

They met with members of the

legislature, the Mayor, and the Chief Judge of the Superior Court
on numerous occasions.
no action was taken.

All agreed that a change was needed, but
After thirteen years of inaction by the

legislature, with caseloads growing, more and more experienced
10

attorneys leaving the practice and real income steadily
declining, the Lawyers needed a vehicle to reach beyond the
polite smiles and nods of elected officials who expressed great
sympathy for the Lawyers* cause, but declined to fund that cause
until an emergency situation had arisen.

In this political

context the Lawyers' boycott was their only effective way of
making their (and their clients') predicament known to the public
and keeping it before the legislature.
The Lawyers' petition of the legislature was no "mere sham"
in order to hurt a competitor, but a genuine effort to influence
governmental action.

The group initiated a concerted publicity

campaign to educate the public as to their plight.

They staged

rallies, walked picket lines, handed out press kits, and gave
newspaper and television interviews, all in their effort to bring
political pressure to bear on the elected officials.

Given the

extensive efforts of the Lawyers to keep the CJA bills before the
legislature, the Lawyers' actions must be seen as an effort to
petition the legislature as required by Noerr.
The Noerr holding did not extend to cases involving both a
boycott and an effort to petition the legislature.

The Noerr

Court granted an antitrust exception to the railroad
association's publicity campaign partially because it bore little
resemblance to a combination traditionally held violative of
antitrust laws.

Though the Lawyers did petition the legislature,

they did so at least partially by combining to form a boycott.
The Noerr Court did not include such a combination within its
11

holding, but neither did it exclude it.

Noerr. 365 U.S. at 136.

Fortunately, subsequent precedent has established the appropriate
standard in such cases.
This Court clarified the scope of the Noerr antitrust
exception in a recent case.

In Allied Tube & Conduit Corn, v.

Indian Head. Inc.. 486 U.S. 492, 108 S.Ct. 1931 (1988), a
polyvinyl conduit manufacturer brought an antitrust action
against steel conduit manufacturers for preventing its product
from being accepted under the privately formed industry standards
often adopted by the government.

The Allied Court adopted a

standard for immunity from antitrust laws under the Noerr
exception: ''[t]he scope of this protection depends ... on the
source, context, and nature of the anticompetitive restraint at
issue."

Allied. 108 S.Ct. at 1936.

If the source of an

anticompetitive restraint such as a boycott is from private
action, "the restraint cannot form the basis for antitrust
liability if it is
governmental action.

incidental' to a valid effort to influence
The validity of such efforts, and thus the

applicability of Noerr immunity, varies with the context and
nature of the activity."

Id. at 1936 (citations omitted).

This

Court declined to extend protection to the context of the case
where the facts involved the lobbying of a private, standard
setting organization to exclude a commercial product from the
market through its standards.

The Court rejected the notion that

the organization was a quasi-legislative body.
at 1939.

Allied. 108 S.Ct.

Absent the presence of a legislative body, the
12

manufacturers' efforts fell into the context of commercial
activity subject to antitrust prosecution.

Id. at 1939.

The Lawyers' action, when viewed in its context and consid
ering its nature, was a valid effort to influence governmental
action.

Unlike the Allied context, the context of the Lawyers'

action demands first amendment protection.

In Allied. this Court

excluded the lobbying of a private standard setting association
from antitrust immunity, however the Lawyers, like the railroads
in Noerr. lobbied the legislature and not a private group.

In

Allied. the manufacturers attempted to keep a competing product
out of the market.

The Lawyers wanted to keep talented attorneys

in the CJA practice and to attract new attorneys into the
practice.

Allied involved manufacturers of commercial products

competing for shares of a limited market.

The Lawyers within the

SCTLA did not attempt to win benefits for their group alone, but
for any lawyers who wished to defend indigent defendants within
the district.

Every attorney who places her name on the CJA list

receives the same rate of compensation regardless of group
membership or experience.

Furthermore, the manufacturers in

Allied sought solely to further their own pecuniary interest.
The Lawyers' action, though not devoid of self-interest, served
to advance the constitutional rights of their clients as well.
Finally, the factfinder in Allied found that the manufacturers
had actually had an adverse impact on competition.

Id. at 1936.

In contrast, the administrative law judge in the present case
found that "there was no harm done" by the Lawyers' actions.
13

In

re SCTLA> 107 F.T.C. at 561.

For these foregoing reasons, the

holding in Allied is not controlling in the present case.
Notwithstanding the Lawyers' use of a boycott, the unique
factual context of the present case requires first amendment
protection.

The refusal of the group to take on any new cases

took place within the broader context of their campaign to change
existing laws.

The Lawyers* had had little success getting their

views out to the general public without the vehicle of a boycott.
The Lawyers are not endowed with the financial resources of the
railroad association in the Noerr case and thus could not stage
an expensive publicity campaign.

At the time of the boycott they

had an average income of approximately $20,000 per year.
Furthermore, they do not have a constituency to rely on for
fundraising, and the indigents whom they represent are largely
without financial resources.

Much like the Mayor, the newsmedia

were not concerned with a thirteen year old problem of the
criminally accused and their lawyers until an emergency situation
had been reached.

The boycott provided the Lawyers with a way to

reach out to the broader public and convey the gravity of their
problem.

In this context, such an expressive boycott should be

protected by the first amendment.
Given the particular context and nature of the Lawyers'
action and given the administrative law judge's finding that no
harm was done by the action, the restraint on trade caused by the
action, if any, was only incidental to their valid effort to
influence governmental action.

The Noerr immunity applies to

such efforts.

Hence, the Lawyers' actions are immune from

antitrust prosecution.
B.

Because the Lawyers' conduct served to protect the
constitutional rights of an underrepresented class.
this Court must award the Lawyers first amendment
protection.

This Court exempts boycotts from antitrust prosecution when
the boycott at issue promotes the constitutional rights of an
underrepresented class.
(1982).

NAACP v. Claiborne. 458 U.S. 886,

Because the Lawyers' boycott promoted the sixth

amendment right to adequate counsel of the Lawyers'
underrepresented clients, the action should be immune from
antitrust prosecution.

In Claiborne. this Court reversed a state

court judgment entered against the NAACP and individual
defendants who participated in a boycott against white merchants.
The boycott aimed at insuring racial justice by, among other
things, forcing local merchants to hire more blacks.

The Court

applied a Noerr analysis to the case and found that a major
purpose of the boycott was to influence government action and
that the boycotters sought to vindicate the constitutional rights
of an underprivileged class.

Given the constitutional

orientation of the boycott, the Court deemed the boycott
"political activity."

Claiborne. 458 U.S. at 914.

The Lawyers' activity, like the boycott in Claiborne, is
political because it promoted the constitutional rights of an
underrepresented class.

The Lawyers represent an

underrepresented class of defendants entitled to counsel under

15

the sixth amendment.

See Gideon v. Wainwriaht. 372 U.S. 335

(1963); Scott v. Illinois. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).

Though the

indigent accused are entitled to this right, they are not
realistically in a position to protect their own sixth amendment
rights to adequate counsel while incarcerated or awaiting trial.
Moreover, much like the boycotters in Claiborne, they are an
unpopular class in the eyes of the majority of the electorate and
have a correspondingly weak lobbying voice.

In both Claiborne

and in this case, the underrepresented class needed the impetus
of an outside organization to protect their constitutional
rights.

In both cases, the boycotts were desperate attempts to

show the injustice done to a politically weak group.

Given the

similarity of the Lawyers' case to the Claiborne case, the
Lawyers' action should be similarly classed as political
activity.
The Claiborne boycott was not devoid of a
self-interested motive.

In Claiborne. the boycotters stood not

only to gain political power, but economic power as well.

One of

the group's demands was for the shop owners to hire more black
workers.

Since almost the entire group of boycotters were black,

this would directly benefit the boycotting group.

Additionally,

blacks stood to benefit economically from their integration into
the political system.

This Court nonetheless recognized that the

economic benefits of the boycott were part and parcel to the
protection of the constitutional rights and granted the boycott
first amendment protection.

Because the economic benefit
16

received by the Lawyers is inexorably linked to the preservation
of their clients' constitutional right to counsel, the Lawyers'
boycott deserves similar protection.
In Claiborne, this Court refused to shut its eyes to the
political realities of a divided city in the Deep South with
divided voting rights.

The Court's decision reflected the fact

that blacks did not have the means to make their demands heard
through the normal political lobbying system.
demands a similar realistic appraisal.

The Lawyers' case

The popularly elected

branches of government are not reelected because they provide for
the defense of the criminally accused.

In the present political

climate, in which many a politician campaigns for reelection on
the increased number of criminal convictions achieved in his or
her previous term of office and on the promotion of victims*
rights, it is extremely difficult to gain political momentum in
favor of spending more tax dollars on defending the accused.
Given this political reality and the importance of the sixth
amendment to our system of criminal justice, the Lawyers' conduct
deserves wide-ranging first amendment protection.
Finally, the Lawyers should not be forced to wait until the
sixth amendment rights of their clients have completely
deteriorated before forcefully defending these rights.

As the

Lawyers* real income declined year after year, they were forced
to take on an increasing caseload without adding support staff.
This pattern is doomed to lead to injustice due to inadequate
counsel.

Once injustice has occurred and an innocent person is
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convicted due to inadequate defense counsel, it is very difficult
to correct.

To overturn his conviction due to lack of adequate

counsel, the criminal defendant faces a heavy burden at the
appellate level.

Criminal defendants should not be forced to

seek justice retroactively through the costly and time consuming
appellate process.

The Lawyers' boycott served to avert such

injustice at their own hands and, therefore, deserves first
amendment protection.
II.

THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE
LAWYERS DO NOT FIT INTO THE TRADITIONAL ANTITRUST BUSINESS
CONTEXT BECAUSE THE LAWYERS' EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT COUPLED WITH
ITS PROCOMPETITIVE POTENTIAL OUTWEIGH ANY TRANSITORY
ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS.
To be unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman Act, a

restraint of trade must be unreasonable.

See

Chicago Bd. of

Trade v. United States. 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Standard Oil v.
United States. 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).

In determining whether

restraints of trade unreasonably restrict competition, this Court
has used two methods of analysis: the rule of reason and the per
se rule.

Under each rule, the purpose of analysis is to form a

judgment about the significance of the restraint.

National Soc'v

of Professional Engineers v. United States. 435 U.S. 679, 691
(1978) .
The inquiry mandated by the rule of reason is whether the
challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that
suppresses it.

To decide that question, courts have consistently

followed the criteria set out by Justice Brandeis in Chicago
Board. 246 U.S. at 231.

Courts have looked at the peculiar
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characteristics of the industry in which the restraint was
applied, its condition before and after the imposition of the
restraint and the history of the restraint.

The focus of the

analysis under the rule of reason is the impact of the practice
on competition in a relevant market.
Certain agreements "that would always or almost always tend
to restrict competition and decrease output" have been condemned
as per se illegal without extensive industry analysis or
thoughtful consideration of legitimate justifications.

Arizona

V. Maricopa County Medical Soc'v. 457 U.S. 332, 334 (1982);
Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting System. 441 U.S. 1, 1920 (1970).

Although horizontal price and output restrictions,

including boycotts, have typically been subject to the per se
rule, several recent decisions refused to apply the per se rule
because "the challenged practices may have redeeming competitive
virtues."

Broadcast Music. 441 U.S. at 9, 13; see also National

Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents. 468 U.S. 85 (1984);
Northern Wholesale Stationers v. Pac. Stationers & Printing. 472
U.S. 284 (1985); Rotherv Storage & Van v. Atlas Van Lines. 792
F.2d 210, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
A.

The per se rule should not apply to the Lawyers'
conduct because the per se analysis is limited to
factual situations which always or almost always tend
to restrict competition.

Because application of the per se rule forecloses any
analysis of a restraint's purpose, its nature and its market
effect, this Court has restricted the per se rule to those
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categories of restraints for which no elaborate study of the
industry is needed to determine that the nature and the effect
are obviously anticompetitive.

Broadcast Music. 441 U.S. at 8;

Professional Engineers. 435 U.S. at 50.
Trade restraints which this Court has analyzed according to
the per se rule facially satisfy three criteria: (1) the
restraint denies something to a competitor which it needs to
compete effectively; (2) the parties entering into the
restraining agreement occupy a dominant position in the relevant
market; and (3) there exists no plausible contention that the
challenged behavior would enhance overall efficiency and make the
market more competitive.

Federal Trade Common v. Indiana Fed*n

of Dentists. 476 U.S. 447 (1986); NCAA. 468 U.S. 85; see also
Maricopa Countv. 457 U.S. 332; Broadcast Music. 441 U.S. 1.
The Lawyers' conduct did not meet any of these three
prerequisites to the application of the per se rule.

Firstly, to

compete effectively in the market for criminal defense of
indigents, access to the CJA system was necessary.

Any local

member in good standing of the D.C. bar could receive CJA
appointments.

A court official assigned the cases on a daily

basis by randomly matching the names of the indigent defendants
with any attorney who had indicated her availability.

The

Lawyers had no control over this assignment procedure.

They

never urged the court officials to participate in their campaign,
nor persuaded them to interrupt the appointment process.
every D.C. attorney had uninhibited access to CJA cases.
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Hence,

Secondly, the Lawyers did not occupy a sufficiently dominant
position in an economic market to force D.C. attorneys to refuse
CJA appointments.

In evaluating a group's market power, courts

have primarily looked to the potential substitutes which enter
the market promptly.

The relevant market includes all

alternative suppliers that will quickly enter the market in
response to a small price increase, as well as those that may
take longer to enter.

While the Lawyers attempted to discourage

many of their colleagues from accepting appointments, they did
not force them to reject CJA cases.

In a recent antitrust

decision, this Court reasoned that:
The per se approach has generally been limited to cases
in which firms with market power boycott suppliers or
customers in order to discourage them from doing
business with a competitor. . . . Moreover, we have
been slow to extend per se analysis to restraints where
the economic impact ... is not immediately obvious.
Indiana Dentists. 476 U.S. at 451.
Thirdly, the number of attorneys willing to take CJA cases
immediately after the Lawyers' campaign increased.

In Pacific

Stationary, this Court reiterated the traditional framework of
analysis under section 1 of the Sherman Act:
Rule-of-reason analysis guides the inquiry, unless the
challenged action falls into the category of agreements
or practices which because of their pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their
use.
Id. at 289 (citations omitted).
The boycott was never aimed at driving potential competitors
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from the market.

Quite the contrary, the Lawyers desired to

improve their working conditions and the quality of their
services, which inevitably increases the attractiveness of the
market.

The fact that after the campaign more attorneys entered

the CJA practice shows that such a campaign does not always tend
to decrease competition.
B.

The presumption that the Lawyers' expressive conduct
constituted an unreasonable restraint on competition
violates their first amendment right to protection.

As stated above, first amendment limitations on governmental
antitrust regulation have been acknowledged in Claiborne, 458
U.S. at 912.

Applying the per se rule to this case would abridge

the Lawyers' first amendment rights because their conduct
included political expression in the form of petitioning the
government for grievances, lobbying and, lastly, boycotting.
Given this political context, the case of United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), enunciated the four-part test
which is appropriate when balancing the government's interest and
the Lawyers' first amendment rights:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified
(1) if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; (2) if it furthers an important or substantial
government interest; (3) if the government's interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than essential to the furtherance of
that interest. ’
Id. at 377.
In O'Brien, the defendant was convicted for violating a
federal statute making the knowing destruction of a draft card a
criminal offense.
This Court held that the statute at issue, on
its face and as applied to O'Brien, met the four-part test.
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In balancing the government's interest in preserving free
enterprise and the Lawyers' first amendment rights, the
government's interest is sufficiently protected if it can prove
the actual harmful impact on competition.

The first three

requirements of the test are undisputed, but the last one, the
presumption that the Lawyers' conduct constituted a per se
violation of the Sherman Act, cannot stand per O'Brien.

The

government's interest in preserving competition is adequately
protected if it has to prove that the restraint in fact had an
adverse effect on competition.

Presuming that conduct which

includes an expressive component violated the antitrust laws
would restrict the first amendment rights in a manner greater
than essential.
The Lawyers' eventual decision not to take further cases and
to encourage the passage of legislation occurred in a political
context.

They had supporters in the entire community: the Mayor,

members of the City Council, Congress and legal and
administrative personnel of the judiciary.

Nonetheless, there

was no motivation for either the Mayor or the Council to actively
support the CJA reform.

The Council was not pushed to act

because the indigent defendants and their attorneys did not
constitute an important political constituency.

The executive

faced more popular projects, and the alleged lack of funding was
the perfect way to shift responsibility.

The Chief Judge at the

Superior Court voiced his concern about having to eventually pass
on the constitutionality of the legislation.
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When the lobbying

for legislative change stalled, the Lawyers looked for other
means to bring the status quo to the attention of the public.
They staged a media campaign, a petition drive and finally
decided not to take further cases.

Their publicity efforts

reveal their social conscience to use political and democratic
channels to achieve their goals.
The per se rule is an evidentiary shortcut designed to
achieve administrative convenience and cost efficiency.

Under

the rule, a court does not have to establish detailed factual
findings about the specific industry in which the restraint
occurred.

In the present situation, however, the presumptive

effect of the rule would swallow the possibility that the Lawyers
campaign changed the public attitude and influenced the passage
of the bill.

The media campaigns, the petition drives and the

active lobbying for legislation manifested the expressive
component of the boycott.

The Court of Appeals recognized the

possibility that the Lawyers "procured a rate increase by
changing public attitude through the publicity attending the
boycott."

SCTLA. 856 F.2d at 251.

The anticompetitive effect on the other hand is not obvious.
In this context, convenience and efficiency cannot outweigh first
amendment rights without violating the fourth prong of O’Brien.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that condemning the boycott as
anticompetitive without proof "ignores the command in O’Brien
that restrictions on activity protected by the first amendment be
no greater than is essential* to preserve competition."
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SCTLA.

r

856 F.2d at 249.
C.

The untraditional market in which the Lawyers provided
their services and the unpredictability of adverse
economic effects on competition require a detailed
industry analysis pursuant to the rule of reason.

In light of this untraditional market, an application of the
per se rule would violate the frequently announced principle that
courts should not classify restraints as per se violations of the
Sherman Act unless they have had considerable experience with
similar business relations.

Maricopa Countv. 457 U.S. at 343;

United States v. Topco Ass'n. 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972).

This

is a case of first impression involving first and sixth amendment
rights and an untraditional market.

The market is unique in that

the price is legislatively set, the actual consumers do not pay
for the services provided to them, and the government has a
constitutional obligation to ensure that the indigent defendants
are adequately represented.

Because prices are set through the

political process, any price adjustments necessarily involve the
first amendment right to petition the government.

Without

examining this particular market, this Court cannot evaluate
whether the price adjustment was due to political persuasion or
economic coercion.
Cases attempting to justify price fixing agreements on a
public service rationale cannot be controlling here.
V. Virginia State Bar. 421 U.S. 773

In Goldfarb

(1975), this Court rejected

the contention that the public service aspect of title
examinations for real property warranted a minimum fee schedule.
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The Virginia State Bar had vigorously enforced a minimum fee
schedule for real estate title examinations by threatening
disciplinary actions in case of deviations.

In Professional

Engineers. this Court considered a provision in a trade
association's canon of ethics which prohibited competitive
bidding prior to the selection of an engineer by a prospective
client.

The purpose of this rule was to minimize the risk that

fierce price competition would lead to inferior engineering
design and endanger public safety.

This Court did not

acknowledge this purpose as an affirmative defense and concluded
that the ban was anticompetitive.

In both cases there existed

elements of a true economic bargain.

The clients could

differentiate according to price, quality and professional
experience.

In the present context, however, the government only

offers one price regardless of experience and expertise, and the
clients are assigned to the defense attorneys through an
administrative procedure.

Consequently, applying the per se rule

would lead to an economically distorted and unconstitutional
result.
D.

The Lawyers' conduct was reasonably necessary to ensure
constitutionally adequate representation as mandated by
the sixth amendment.

A "practice reasonably necessary to accomplish a legitimate
business purpose that produces only an insignificant restriction
of competition is not unlawful." Topco. 405 U.S. at 606.

As

attorneys and members of the bar, the Lawyers had a professional
duty to provide adequate legal services to their clients. This
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duty constitutes a legitimate business purpose.

While their

services might not have fallen below a professional standard, it
would be unsound public policy and economically inefficient to
wait until that point had been reached.
Their conduct have had an incidental adverse effect on
competition.

However, this transient impact was insignificant

and therefore not unlawful.

Following the rate increase more

attorneys were willing to represent indigent criminals and the
CJA regulars did not increase their case load.

The Lawyers'

temporary supply restricting arrangement was not any broader than
necessary to accomplish its procompetitive goals.
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CONCLUSION
The Lawyers* actions should be protected by the first
amendment for two reasons.

Firstly, the first amendment shields

valid efforts to petition the legislature from antitrust prosecu
tion.

Secondly, the first amendment protects boycott efforts

that are made in furtherance of the constitutional rights of an
underrepresented class.
Alternatively, should this Court deny the Lawyers first
amendment immunity, the Court should apply the rule of reason
analysis to this case and thus require the government to prove an
anticompetitive effect.
For the foregoing reasons, the Lawyers prays this Court to
reverse the decision of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and
hold that (1) the first amendment exempts the Lawyers* actions in
this case from antitrust prosecution.

If the Court does not so

hold, then the Respondent prays this Court to affirm the Court of
Appeals* decision and hold that (2) the per se analysis cannot be
applied in this case.
Dated: November 15, 1989.
Respectfully submitted,

Counsel for Respondent

STATUTORY APPENDIX
U.S. Constitution, amendment I:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. Constitution, amendment VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and the
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. section 1:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal.
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